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Column: The Physics of Digital Information1
Fred Cohen
One of the interesting questions underlying creating a science of digital
forensics is what form that science might take. At the end of the IEEE Oakland
Conference in 2011, I presented some of the underlying questions and
identified my approach and why I favored it.2 My basic position is that science
is about causality and a scientific theory should require that cause(C) produces
effect (E) via mechanism M (written C→ME). The scientific method then
identifies the criteria for rejecting (refuting) or accepting (for a time) a
scientific theory.
The method mandates that someone proposing a theory hypothesize a specific
C→ME by identifying specific sets of causes, mechanisms, and effects. The
term specific is intended to indicate that C,M, and E are identifiable by
independent third parties and properly differentiated to a defined degree of
precision and with a defined degree of accuracy in terms of things that can be
measured. Experiments are then defined so as to seek to refute the hypothesis
by performing experiments that will produce outcomes outside of the defined
results of the theory. As and if these hypotheses are found unrefuted time and
again, they become part of the theory of the day,. Always subject to refinement
and potential refutation.
Of course a classic example of a scientific theory was the theory that the world
is flat. The experiment; keep sailing west - if you come back from the east, the
world is round. This experiment was repeated many times, confirmed again and
again as lots of ships didn't come back. So many didn't come back, that this
became a valid scientific theory – until the first one made it around. Then it
was refuted and replaced with another theory – the world is round. But even
today, the flat-world theory use useful for special cases. For example, buildings
are not designed based on the curvature.
Interestingly, sciences like physics and biology came to be in different ways
than the current science underlying digital systems. In particular, physics and
biology both come about based on observations of nature, theories (e.g.,
Newton, microorganisms), testing and generalization, the ability to build
reliable systems within defined limits, problems resulting in refutation, new
theories (e.g., quantum, genetics), more testing and generalization, and the
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ability to again build reliably in more circumstances and to tighter limits.
Digital science has proceeded differently. It has gone from mathematical
theories to complexity issues, some models were built, but they were
problematic, and thus we still cannot build such systems very reliably (at the
level of systems we build today). There has been no higher level theory similar
to Newtonian physics or the theory of cells, and here we are.
Other approaches to protection science include archeology, which is the NSF's
current thinking on digital forensics, engineering, which has continued to fail
over a long time, and social science approaches, which hold promise for many
but not all aspects of the area, largely because the statistical approach is
problematic in the digital domain.
My approach has been to try to build out a middle level theory for digital
forensics – a physics of digital information. Full details of the current version
of this physics are available online3, and a short summary of a few key points
of difference between the digital space and the physical space is all that can be
provided here to give a sense of where it is going.
In keeping with previous results suggesting that consensus around common
definitions for the field of digital forensics do not exist,4 each item discussed
will start with a loose definition and example.
Definition: Finite granularity means that, at the end of the day, you can only
get so small, and no smaller. Finite granularity in space means that there is a
minimum size (i.e., the bit) and finite granularity in time means that there is a
minimum time unit (i.e., the number of bits that represent a time unit, or
alternatively, the maximum clock speed of the mechanisms generating the
bits).
In terms of digital evidence (not the physical media that may contain it), no
matter how much of it you have, there is no unit of that evidence smaller than a
bit, and no matter has much precision you make measurements with, the times
associated with those bits cannot be infinitesimally small. Thus:
Digital evidence is finite in granularity in both space and time.
Compare this to the physical world where, according to the current widely
accepted theories of physics, we don't have a defined limit on the smallest unit
of space or time. This is because we generally consider space and time to be
continuous.
Definition: Observation of digital information means to be able to determine
3
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what binary value each bit of the information has, while alteration is the
changing of a bit value to the other bit value (digital information by definition
only has two different values for bits).
At the level of digital evidence, when reading bits from a disk, the bits on the
disk are observed by the mechanisms of the disk drive. When writing to a disk,
some of the bits on the disk may be altered. Of course the specific technology
may physically alter the stored representation of the bits on every read, for
example by reading and then rewriting the original bits in a different physical
location or rearranging the coding of the bits as stored. But this doesn't change
the digital value represented. Thus:
Normally, we can observe digital information without altering it.
In the current widely accepted theory of physicals, this is not true at the lowest
level of granularity. Every observation alters the thing being observed.5 Of
course looking at paint doesn't change it from blue to red, and this “observer
effect” is not normally noticeable. In the case of bits, since they are engineered
and stored and/or coded so that altering a small portion of their physical state
does not alter the observed value at the level of the bit, we don't have the same
problem. If this were not true we would have a very different field.
Definition: Duplication of digital information means to make an exact copy of
the bit sequences comprising the digital information. Removal of digital
information means making alterations so that the original information (i.e., the
original bit sequence) is no longer present where it originally was present
before.
For example, a duplicate of the bit sequence 1 0 1 will also be the bit sequence
1 0 1. The removal of the bit sequence 1 0 1 from a location would mean that
the bit sequence at that location was no longer 1 0 1. Thus:
You can usually duplicate digital information without removing it.
Compare this to the physical world where, if you “take” something, like an
original painting, it is no longer there. Duplicates at the level of a painting are
always differentiable from originals at some level of physicality, and thus
forgery is never “perfect” in the sense of impossible to discern from the
original. Of course figuring out which came first is another issue...
Definition: Transfer is a concept in which two objects coming into contact
with each other each leaves something of itself with the other. This is generally
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attributed to Locard,6 even though the more precise definition of the term used
here appeared later.
For example, when a shirt rubs up against a sharp object, some shards from the
object may get transfered to the shirt while some fibers from the shirt may get
transferred to the sharp object.
Digital evidence is normally not transfer evidence.
In physical evidence, at some level of granularity, this is almost certainly true –
subatomic particles will likely transfer between objects, even though at that
level, they are indistinguishable from each other. But digital evidence does not
come about through such a process. While we may think of a file transfer as the
same thing, it is not. It is the duplication of bit sequences through a process that
produces a bit sequence elsewhere without the movement of any of the
physical elements storing the original bits. This may be clearly seen if the
original was stored on optical media and the result of interaction produced a bit
sequence on magnetic media. None of the light and dark spots were placed on
the magnetic media.
Definition: Trace evidence is evidence that is produced as the result of a
process, so that the presence of the evidence is consistent with the execution of
the process.
When a pen writes on paper, the indentations in the paper resulting from the
writing are traces of the process of writing. Similarly, when a computer
program produces bit sequences that are stored on a disk, the bit sequences are
traces of the execution of the computer hardware and software that produced
them. Thus:
Digital evidence is normally trace evidence.
Physical evidence is also normally trace evidence as well in that it is produced
by some physical mechanism, and the presence of the evidence is consistent
with some set of physical processes.
Definition: Latent evidence is evidence that cannot be directly observed by
human senses.
DNA evidence, for example, is normally latent evidence in that the DNA has to
be processed by a mechanism to produce a result that can be examined by
human senses. So are most fingerprints, many tool marks, and many other sorts
of evidence. And of course:
Digital evidence is normally latent in nature.
6
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In fact, almost no digital evidence can be presented in its original form (other
than the placement of a disk drive in front of the jury). It has to be turned into
something humanly observable, like a printout or a display on a video screen.
And this means that the tools used to turn the evidence into something people
can observe has to be validated and shown reliable in order to pass muster in
court.
Definition: Computational complexity is the number of low-level computing
operations required in order to perform an algorithm which processes
information.
As we have all seen, computers are not infinitely fast. Different operations take
different amounts of time. It takes more computer time to determine the best
possible route from house to house throughout a city that to find any route that
passes by all of those same houses because the former problem is more
complex than the latter.
Computational complexity limits digital forensic analysis.
The time limits on examination of evidence means that certain techniques that
take a great deal of computation cannot practically be applied in most cases.
Even with parallel processing and cloud computing systems, this remains true.
For this reason, we often use approximate algorithms or methods that are
different from what might be used in other fields.
Definition: Consistency between two or more things means that each is the
way you would expect it to be if the other ones are the way you observe them
to be.
If you see a black box and someone else viewing the same object under the
same conditions states that it is a white sphere, your observation is inconsistent
with their statement. Similarly, if a sworn statement states that a particular file
was created at 10AM on a particular day in a particular place, and the metadata
for the file indicates that the same file was created at a different time on a
different day, the sworn statement is inconsistent with the metadata. As a
fundamental of digital forensics:
What is inconsistent is not true.
or in other words:
Inconsistent things cannot all be true.
If the metadata disagrees irreconcilably with the person, they can't both be
right. Each actual event that takes place takes place within a bounded area of
space and time, and the same event cannot take place in two mutually exclusive
times and places. But this doesn't mean that, for example, the metadata
associated with the file reflects the same event that the person was talking
about. Thus inconsistency must be examined closely in order to make sure that
there isn't some consistent explanation.
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Notionally, these definitions and explanations may be viewed as the start of
part of a physics of digital information. This physics may be seen as a layer
above the mathematics that underlies computers.
As a physics, these rules applied in context explain and predict behaviors of
digital systems. If you agree to the details of the physics above, it means that
you can make forensically sound copies of digital data that, at the level of
digital evidence, are every bit as good as the original. If you don't agree, then
such copies cannot be forensically sound in that they cannot maintain the
digital properties of the original that are critical to its use, unless you can come
up with some other physics that will gain acceptance and under which they will
be admitted.
Assuming you buy into this view of physics, the physics of digital systems is
different than that of the normal physical world, and that means that the way
we normally view the natural world is off kilter from the nature of the digital
world in at least these ways. If you stole that information, how come I still see
it there? If a copy of a piece of paper is not as good as the original for evidence,
how come a copy of the bits on the computer, even though they are on a
different sort of media, are as good as the original bits?
A final comment
The issue of consensus around these basics of digital forensics is not fully
settled today. But at least for the items identified in this article, consensus is
getting pretty close. At the end of the day, consensus is what the scientists,
practitioners, and researchers in the field come to agree on. It's not what I say –
it's what you say – and do – as a group.
I urge you to take some time and review the details of the physics of digital
forensics and draw your own conclusions. Read the chapter cited above,
comment on it, prove it is wrong if and where it is, show its limits, and move
the field forward. Hopefully, over time, we will come to an understanding that
will help us all move forward and advance the field together.
At least that's how I see it.
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